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In a modern world, where the malicious attacks of interconnected devices rises 
stemming from increased adoption of such systems. Security of these systems have 
repeatedly been bypassed, as such requiring secure validation through truly unique 
responses to an authentication request which cannot be impersonated. A resonant 
tunnelling diode has been shown useful by having a single unique and uncloneable 
response. The electrically driven device outputs a signature unique to the individual 
device which is uncloneable even by the manufacturer. The purpose of this work is to 
expand the range of responses of an individual authentication system using resonant 
tunnelling diodes. 
The combination of resonant tunnelling diodes show a response unique to the base 
devices with multiple points of authentication. By creating an array structure where 
devices can be combined in different permutations, the set of responses can be 
increased. Varying the array’s design can maximise the set of response to scale 
exponentially with the number of devices. The possibility of predicting a set of 
responses is explored through the initial measurement of base array devices. The risk 
is explored through the ability to deconvolute array responses into single device 
signatures and creation of subsequent array responses. 
A designed and implemented 4x4, 16 device array with 256 responses is shown to 
have 99% uniqueness for each 4-peak permutation with a ~20% chance that any single 
peak will give a false negative response when compared with the expected output. The 
combination of devices is shown to be random in nature with how the device’s signature 
shift when a second device is applied. The resultant system is given as a design for 
secure alternative to the current widely used authentication systems in small electronic 




 - Introduction into Authentication 
Based on Atomic Imperfections 
1.1 Motivation 
In a world where almost every electrical smart device, program and database is 
connected, with the ability to transfer large volumes of data through this network, the 
security of these systems is of utmost importance. In this modern day, devices like 
these have made it into our homes with the invention of intelligent personal assistants, 
such as Alexa, Cortana, Mycroft, etc [2-4], which are widely connected, controlling 
lights, heating and even financial interactions with only a spoken word. Other 
electronics include smart doorbells, bulbs, thermostats and more [5-7] all of which can 
connect to the Internet of Things (IoT) with the potential to be hijacked. 
With the growing size of the Internet of Things (IoT), a network of connected devices, 
the need for secure communications has become more prevalent. These systems can, 
for example, be processing financial data, private communications and even contain 
huge amounts of personal information. Secure transmission between these 
interconnected devices is required such that nefarious parties are unable to pry into 
private data and identities. Due to the nature of the IoT, it is required that each 
individual node of the IoT be secured as once a single node is compromised, then the 
whole system of devices becomes compromised. 
Some of the most worrying and devastating attacks on the IoT come in the form of 
widespread distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS) or manipulation of devices. 
DDoS attacks consist of sending networks huge amounts of data to slow or even halt 
systems. One of the largest being an attack on service provider Dyn [8]. Attacks to 
manipulate vehicles have been shown on a Jeep [9], the attack gave complete control 
over the movement of the vehicle while in transit containing passengers. Smaller 




With a rise in interconnected devices, there has also been a proportional rise in reports 
of hacking, misappropriation and electronic theft. The range and scope of breaches to 
electronic systems can be wide, ranging from small and insignificant items to large.  
To protect from breaches, each node of an IoT needs to be extremely difficult to 
bypass. A successful attack would be outweighed by the time and risk in doing so. 
Hereby the first requirement would be that each authentication code needs to be 
unique compared to its counterparts, such that brute-forcing a bypass by guessing at 
an authentication code would become difficult. 
Further requirements allow for ease of implementation into any device within an IoT 
system. IoT devices tend to be small with low-power systems, as such solutions must 
abide by the restriction in being compact, low-cost with low-power requirements. As 
such solutions should be self-contained which would allow for the system to be as 
secure as possible, while also allowing it to be versatile in terms of its implementation 
into IoT devices. 
1.2 Authentication and Identities in a Modern Society 
The main way of bypassing such a code would be to decipher what the authentication 
code would be. If an authentication code is unique to a device for a user, then only 
users with authentication can access that device, program or database. The way in 
which authentication over a virtual space is achieved at a basic level is the sharing of 
a secret as registration, which becomes the authentication code. The user then 
provides the secret to the authentication system, which compares against the 




Currently, the way in which this is carried out varies by level of security, data accessed 
and the maker of the system. Secrets shared for authentication purposes can range 
from personal information to physical objects which contain some amount of data. For 
example, most web accounts require a password, of a certain length composed of 
alphanumeric digits, which provides authentication. On the other end of the spectrum, 
a physical card and a randomly assigned code have a similar process for financial 
transactions. For ultra-high security, fingerprint or retina scans can be used as a form 
of unique personal information. Although the cost of such high-security tends to be too 
much for consumer grade security purposes. Thus, a unique outputting device, for low 
cost would be required to fill this gap, a device which, like a fingerprint, is defined as 
unique and unable to be cloned. 
An authentication system with a unique output can be defined by a physically 
uncloneable function (PUF). While the output of such a system would be unique, it is 
also defined as being impossible or very difficult to reliably clone the physical system 





1.3 Physical Uncloneable Functions 
PUFs are generally defined as a system, physically unique in its creation, whereby 
when probed by a range of inputs give unique responses due to the internal structure 
of the system [10]. Each device has a distinctive output which is not replicated and is 
obtained from its paired input hence they can be used for identification and 
authentication. It is comparable to a set of one-way functions in that outputs are easily 
computable from the input, but the inverse is much harder to obtain. While the PUF is 
a one-way function, it has a requirement to be uncloneable so that an attacker, with 
access to the original system, is unable to replicate a copy of the system through any 
means. For PUFs to be as useful as possible there is a need for them to be low cost 
and simple to make, yet almost impossible to clone, even if the manufacturing is copied 
exactly.  
Systems which are implemented as PUFs can be characterised by the security it 
provides and how it performs this. The merit of security in this instance falls to the 
response of a device when a challenge is applied to the system. The Challenge-
Response Pairs (CRPs) from each representation can be a set of authentication tools, 
where a larger set often denotes a stronger system. 
Additionally, PUFs can be characterised by the effect which creates the randomness 
such as classical interactions and quantum effects. However, some use introduced 
randomness as opposed to the intrinsic randomness of the devices to produce unique 
outputs of PUFs. 
Introduced randomness is attractive due to its lower dependency on environmental 
variations and the ability to easily distinguish devices. Optical PUFs, made from 
transparent materials doped with particles which scatter the light [11], and coating 
PUFs, using a random scattering of dielectric particles to create random capacitance 




However, intrinsic randomness is often preferred, as it can be included in a design 
without modification to the manufacturing process. Intrinsic classical randomness 
arises from a variety of methods. Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) can be used 
in a PUF, by reading each transistor cell upon start-up [12]. Due to manufacturing 
variations, each transistor cell is more likely to tend to a 0 or 1 when powered off. This 
can be read and used as a unique PUF [13]. 
A quantum PUF can utilise the quantum regime to produce truly random and unique 
outputs from quantum effects and atomic differences in the atoms comprising of the 
PUF. Once a quantum level is reached, minor differences in interfaces or material 
composition can vastly change the response garnished from a single system. With 
such a level of intricacy, the ability to reliably reproduce any PUF relying on quantum 
effects severely decrease. To reproduce a clone of any single device would require 
atomic-level engineering on a large-scale due to the number of atoms which make up 
an individual structure. 
PUFs can be implemented into a secure system using a variety of algorithms, which 
ultimately describe how keys and information are passed between sender and 
recipient. Such algorithms can be via the use of CRPs so that the response from a PUF 
can be compared against the database response to allow authentication of a system. 
Emerging, untapped implementation of the Public-PUF (PPUF), uses a public and 
private encryption to facilitate secure communication and authentication. 
Communication via public-private keys, such that information is secured via the public 
key by the sender, un-encrypting of the information can only be done by a private key 




Authentication via a PPUF is facilitated by a public model of the hardware PUF. The 
hardware version would be able to compute the response from a challenge at a faster 
rate than that of the public model of the PUF. As such a timed-authentication technique 
can be employed, whereby the response from a client can be timed in conjunction with 
the response. The client, who hold the hardware PUF, computes the response at a 
much faster rate than any public model could, at which point the time of the response 
and the response is compared to that of the model. Therefore, only allowing the 
hardware model to be authenticated. 
1.3.1 Different forms of PUF 
Physically uncloneable functions come in a variety of different forms, each with different 
axioms which they require to determine the type, level of security and the ease of use. 
The security of a PUF increases normally with the number of unique responses output 
by an individual system along with its ability to be cloned through various means. 
Unique Objects, (UNOs), are a physical display with some random characteristics, 
which when challenged by external measurements, can define a small, fixed output set 
which is unique from any other object. The physical system is impossible to recreate 
even if the exact fabrication and structure of the original UNO are known. However, 
due to its nature, it is possible to simulate the UNO this is guarded against by a visual 
verification of the device.  
The visual device is often represented by a random function which is externally 
measured and outputs a unique signal of some capacity. Often properties like this are 
referred to as a ‘fingerprint’ of a unique object due to the visual nature of the device. 
Unique objects are suited towards being used in a capacity that allowed them to be 
visually checked upon measurement, for signs of being tampered with. Hence, they 
are appropriate for use in confirmation of the authenticity of physical goods as opposed 




Weak physical uncloneable functions are defined by the number of CRPs which the 
system can produce. The weakness of the system is derived from the small number of 
CRPs which it possesses and generally come from a linear increase of CRPs with 
respect to a property of the system. While it is described as ‘weak’, it is still useful as a 
form of security due to its unique outputs. However, to overcome its weakness, a 
requirement is that access to the CRPs is protected such that each response can be 
used multiple times. To aid with its protected access, an internal measurement system 
is required so that the responses from the system cannot be catalogued by a nefarious 
party. 
Strong physical uncloneable functions are described similarly to their weak counterpart. 
While it’s unique outputs can be like that of a weak PUF the strength of the system is 
derived from the large set of CRPs. This large set tends to be a by-product of the likely 
exponential increase of CRPs with respect to some property of the system. As such, a 
system with such a large set of responses can be given to an attacker, with unlimited 
access and yet still be a secure system. This is such that, with the large set, all 
responses cannot be read in a reasonable time-frame nor can further responses be 
derived from previously categorised responses due to the unique and unpredictable 
nature of the responses. With the strength of the system, it is not necessary for the 
system to have an internal measurement system. The state of its measurement system 




1.3.2 Challenges in PUF Technology 
Since the inception of PUFs, the main obstacle to overcome is to prove that the physical 
representation of a PUF cannot be cloned. This being one of the main requirements of 
a PUF so that they should be uncloneable. Either their inherent random nature is 
unpredictable and difficult to reproduce, or outputting a unique and distinctive response 
such that a device trying to imitate the response would be impossible. Original 
requirements stated that the devices should be unable to be cloned, even by a 
manufacturer; difficult to fully characterise and difficult to access by the attacker. 
Therefore tamper resistances should be added to prevent this sort of unauthorized 
modification of the devices [14]. 
Some forms of PUF so far have been shown to lack these qualities through various 
means of manipulation by cloning of the physical device, mimicking a response, or 
tracking the outputs and using the database to authenticate a nefarious party. Using 
machine learning, an Arbiter PUF could be represented via a software model of the 
device predicting correct responses [15]. 
For higher security purposes, a software model becomes an impractical solution and a 
physical copy is required. An SRAM PUF, previously described in its operation, has 
been shown that it can be cloned creating a physical copy of the target response. This 
was achieved through the modification of a similar device via use of a Focused Ion 
Beam Circuit Edit (FIB CE) to thin the substrate and bias the nodes of the device. The 
two methods are the removal of transistors to achieve deterministic behaviours or a 
trimming of transistors to alter their performance. By allowing FIB CEs from the 





1.4 Quantum-Confinement PUF 
In “Using quantum confinement to uniquely identify devices”, J. Roberts et al [1], uses 
Resonant Tunnelling Diodes (RTDs) as a weak physically uncloneable function with 
one CRP per device. The results given in this paper show that single RTDs, due to the 
uncontrollable atomic differences appearing during the fabrication process, produce 
unique signatures in their I/V spectrum.  
RTDs, being the physical representation of a quantum well made from semiconductor 
materials, are shown to be easy to fabricate. The response of an RTD is difficult to 
reproduce due to the unpredictable nature of its atomic structure. The reproducibility of 
a single system is hence difficult to reproduce or copy due to the atomic differences in 
each RTD. However, these devices are shown to be easy to measure and robust in 
their measurement. RTDs can be challenged in an electronic circuit for which its 
current-voltage (I/V) spectrum is seen to be both stable and unique. Such that repeated 
measurements show very little deviation in peak position, found to be upwards of 95% 
confidence limits with a standard deviation of around 1.96. 
Furthermore, the position of an RTD’s peak is split into 256 bins across both axes. The 
probability of a peak switching bins when re-measured is given at 11.4% and 0.54% 
for the x and y-axis respectively. Improvements to the devices are discussed by refining 




1.4.1 Improving the QC-PUF 
The QC-PUF from the size of its CRPs such that each device only contains 1 response 
per device, thus constituting a weak PUF. However, due to the RTD being used as an 
electronic circuit component it becomes being viable to place multiple RTDs in a single 
circuit and therefore increasing the output of the devices. By varying the readable 
devices in a single circuit, an increased number of CRPs can be measured from a 
single system. Furthermore, depending on the number of devices which are read in a 
single circuit, it would be possible to increase the bit output of the devices from one to 
the number of devices in series. This can be derived from multiple peaks shown for 
any single response of an array due to the series nature of these electronic devices. 
By increasing the RTDs in a single system and placing them in an array structure, an 
exponential increase in CRPs with respect to the devices can be achieved. The set of 
CRPs could be defined as a strong PUF due to the number of CRPs which a single 
system creates. 
Being that RTDs are made from semiconductor materials and are very small (on the 
order of µm), this representation of a strong PUF would be ideal for IoT applications as 






This research expands on previously explored devices which have a single unique and 
robust response by combining multiple devices in various arrays. The merits of each 
array are explored and an optimal design is produced. By varying the dimensions of 
the array of resonant tunnelling diodes, it is possible to explore the effect on the set of 
responses. The array is shown to allow its outputs to be maximised and tailored to the 
security level required. The significance of this research is the increase from a single 
response PUF system to an exponentially increasing response system under the 
definition for a strong PUF. 
The resonant tunnelling diodes are explored through the resulting effect when devices 
are combined in series. Combinations are shown to be unique to the constituent 
devices but convoluted enough that it becomes very difficult to find constituent devices. 
While some types of PUF design have been shown to be clone-able, this research 
verifies the difficulty and complexity of successfully cloning the PUF system described 
and designed herein. 
The importance of a system with a large set of unique responses come from the need 
for secure systems as modern dependence on mobile systems increases. 
Conventional security falls short due to user negligence or weak security parameters 
such that nefarious parties can access systems with relative ease. The system 
described herein would increase the security of IoT systems and make unauthorised 




1.6 Outline of Thesis 
In this research, we postulate the use of a known weak PUF and its unique 
combinations to give a representation of a strong PUF. By employing the classical 
interactions between quantum devices, we aim to prove the uniqueness of an 
exponentially increasing depiction of a strong PUF for each permutation and its inability 
to predict the output of each permutation even if given the output of the single devices 
or the previously attained responses. 
In chapter 1, the background to the security of systems and their current state has been 
explored with the motivation for why a more robust security representation is required. 
A study of PUFs and different types available is given and the possibility of cloning on 
devices is explored. An introduction to a PUF using quantum effects and the postulation 
for an improvement from weak PUF to Strong PUF is discussed. 
The next chapter, background and theory, covers a basic introduction to semiconductor 
materials for the purposes of use within this research and the cited research papers 
which provide some background. An Introduction to the theory behind confinement of 
carriers at a quantum level in multiple dimensions is given with the density of states for 
each of the confinement levels. A further explanation of the conduction mechanisms of 
resonant tunnelling diodes and the interesting negative differential region. Where the 
uniqueness of the device and various electronic implementations are explored 
including memory storage, oscillators and random number generators. Finally, a more 
detailed exploration into a quantum confinement PUF including an explanation of the 




The third chapter detailing experimental methods includes fabrication of devices, the 
design of arrays of RTDs to produce a large set of challenge-response pairs, electronic 
characterization of the array system and deconvolution of the spectra. Fabrication 
details the MBE growth of devices along with the preparation and integration into an 
electronic circuit. Design of the array details a systematic improvement of the array 
design to increase challenge-response pairs while reducing exposure to potential side-
channel attacks.  An experimental setup to characterize the devices unique output is 
shown along with a deconvolution of the devices unique output. Lastly, a method to 
show robustness and uniqueness quantitatively is shown. 
A results chapter follows which first explores the interaction between two devices to 
better understand how devices interact when in series. Robustness measurements and 
uniqueness overlap of devices are found which will show how defined each 
permutation is compared to subsequent permutations alongside measurement of the 
properties, the shift in voltage caused by devices in conjunction is explored along with 
how devices cluster with respect to the derivative devices and the device causing the 
shift. Further, 2x2 to 4x4 arrays are categorised similarly to the combination of in-series 
devices. The spread of data along with how well defined unique points are without any 
correlation in the spread. Lastly, the possibility of finding responses from the 
deconvolution of previous permutations is explored via a software model of the 
combination of devices. 
A conclusion discusses the ability of the proposed strong PUF designed to create a 
useful physical authentication system. A final section discusses further work to improve 
the system and explore its possible weaknesses. The movement to a single complete 
system with the ability to be used in an IoT system is described with a more in-depth 
description found in Chapter 3.
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 – Background and Theory 
2.1 Semiconductors 
This section highlights the key concepts of semiconductors in solid state physics, which 
is for the purposes of using semiconductors as a form of PUF. Using the background, 
it can be understood where the uniqueness of physical structures can be found and 
what causes them. 
2.1.1 Introduction to Semiconducting Materials 
A semiconductor is a material which, in terms of its electron transmission properties, 
exist between a metal and an insulator (Figure 1), due to its narrow energy bandgap. 
The bandgap is the region which occurs between the lowest point of the conduction 
band and the highest point of the valence band. In a metal, the valence and conduction 
band overlap causing the bandgap to be non-existent hence the charge carriers can 
pass through the material with ease. On the other hand, insulators have a large 
differenc in conduction and valence bands such that the transmission of charge carriers 
encounter a large difference in energy when traversing the material.  
 
Figure 1 : Simplified band structure of a metal, semiconductor and an 
insulator. In a metal where the valence band and the conduction band 
overlap, carrier transport is easy, whereas an insulator has a large 
bandgap and hence carrier need a large energy to pass the bandgap to 
the conduction band. A Fermi level where the 50% population 




For charge carriers to populate the conduction band from the valence band, they 
require energy larger than or equal to the bandgap. The large energy required leads to 
the carrier population of the conduction band being negligible even when the material 
reaches a normal operating temperature (e.g. Room temperature). In contrast to both 
metals and insulators, semiconductor have a narrow band gap, such that carriers 
needn’t have much energy to make the transition from valence band to conduction 
band but cannot freely make the transition as in a metal. 
2.1.2 Fermi Level  
The Fermi level (Figure 1), is defined as the hypothetical energy level where a 50% 
chance occupancy of an energy level occurs within the material at thermal equilibrium. 
With the use of doping (intentionally creating impurities in the crystal), the Fermi level 
can be shifted closer to the conduction band or the valence band. The shift occurs due 
to the doping material having a different number of electrons to the surrounding 
material. The shift of the Fermi level changes the electrical properties of the material, 
such that a Fermi level shifted towards the conduction band, an n-type semiconductor, 
allows the conduction band to be populated easily. However, a shift towards the 
valence band, a p-type semiconductor, makes it more likely for the upper states of the 
valence band to be empty. A p-n junction is created when these two materials are 
placed next to each other and is used in electronics for a variety of purposes such as 
to excite structures with a flow of electrons. 
The Fermi level is also defined as the maximum energy that an electron can have at 
absolute zero. This is described by the Fermi-Dirac distribution (1) whereby at absolute 
zero the probability of an electron in a state above the Fermi level (𝜇) is zero, and 









Where 𝜀 is energy, T is absolute energy and k is the Boltzmann constant. 
As the temperature increases, as does the likelihood that an electron can be excited 
into the conduction band, hence the occupation probability above the Fermi Level 
increases. As the system can be described as closed, an increase of conduction 
occupancy leads to the reduction the occupancy below the Fermi level. 
2.1.3 Semiconductor PUFs 
Integrated PUFs on a silicon wafer are most often the result of semiconductor process 
variations. Hence, even when an exact fabrication method is used, unpredictable 
outputs of systems can be produced. 
A VIA-PUF [16] is a perfect example of a consistent fabrication method creating 
unpredictable results which can form the basis of a PUF utilising a semiconductor 
process. A via is a way to connect vertically adjacent layers of a device together. These 
are often used in printed circuit board fabrication, notably for the connection of 
grounding planes for the system. Here, the author of the VIA-PUF [16] proposes using 
the probability formation in circuit layouts. As the size of the via is reduced, the 
probability for the via to be successfully formed decreases accordingly. Thereby, a 
successful formation is assigned a digital value of 1, otherwise, is assigned a value of 
0. 
2.2 Quantum Confinement  
Quantum confinement can be described in multiple dimensions, by confining it in one-
dimension (creating a quantum well) up to three-dimensions of a quantum dot where 





2.2.1 Confinement in One-Dimension  
A one-dimensional confinement system is described by a quantum well, which in an 
ideal model is described as infinitely deep. From the previous assumption, it removes 
the possibility of the carrier to escape when its energy reaches such a level that the 
state it occupies is more than that of the barrier energy. Quantum wells are described 
by a region which is occupiable by carriers and the surrounding region is classically 
forbidden for carriers to occupy. This creates a region where the carrier is confined 
between two classically forbidden regions. The quantum confinement effect occurs as 
the size of the occupiable region is reduced to a comparable distance to that of the de 
Broglie wavelength of electrons and holes. 
To create a device in which these properties exist, layered heterostructures of 
semiconductors are epitaxially deposited on a substrate (3.2.1). Here, a material with 
a depth comparable to the de Broglie wavelength is sandwiched between two materials 
with a much larger bandgap. The fill layer results in confinement for electrons and 
holes, creating a quantum well. For a single electron in motion through a semiconductor 





Where m* is the effective mass of the carrier, h is the Planck constant and kb is the 
Boltzmann Constant. For an electron in a GaAs crystal (where m* = 0.067) at room 
temperature (300K), the de Broglie wavelength is ~42nm. Thus, quantum confinement 
effects govern the properties of the structure with a size on the order of tens of nm. 
The properties of the devices used with the system have an effect which is governed 
by the confinement occurring within a quantum well. These effects can best be 





2.2.2 ‘Particle in a Box’ Approximation 
The ‘particle in a box’ approximation describes a particle’s free movement in a small 
space surround by impenetrable barriers 
The confinement causes the energy levels to become discrete states, described by the 






Ψn(x) + V(x)Ψn(x) = EnΨn(x) 
Where V(x) is the potential energy of the model, Ψn(x) is the wavefunction which 
describes the fundamental behaviour of the particle such as position, momentum and 
energy. En describes the eigenenergy of the system for each value of n, the principal 
quantum number. Further, ℏ is the reduced Planck constant and m* is the effective 
mass of the carrier. Considering the infinite well height and the condition that the 





















Figure 2 : Ideal quantum well representation where the well is infinitely deep and 
has a width of L where the boundaries of the well are 0 and L along the x-axis. It 








For these solutions, the first three energy levels are shown in Figure 3. An important 
characteristic of these solutions is that En is inversely proportional to the square of L. 
This, for the purposes of unique identification, shows that even atomic differences in 
the width of the well will change the discrete energy at which the energy states occur 
at. 
 
In reality (due to the finite barrier height) the energy levels are confined to those which 
occur under the barrier height and also leads to quantum tunnelling of the carrier 
wavefunctions into the barriers. Interestingly, the well width can be tuned such that the 
eigenenergy allows for the emission of a specific wavelength. With these solutions and 
as can be seen in Figure 3, the first energy level (zero-point energy) is not zero, this is 




   
where σx,σP are the standard deviations of position and momentum respectively. 
Due to the particle being confined in a region of space, the variation on its position is 
confined also. To avoid violating the uncertainty principle, the particles moment cannot 
be zero, such that hence the particle must have some finite energy. As the well-width 
increases, its position becomes more defined, and hence the momentum and zero-
point energy must increase to compensate. 
Figure 3 : Energy levels of a quantum 
well structure. The first three energy 






2.2.3 Confinement in Multiple Dimensions 
Confinement in one-dimension can be easily expanded to approximate confinement in 
an increasing number of spatial dimensions. As such, two and three-dimensional 
confinement can be represented by a quantum wire and quantum dot respectively. 
The density of states (often used to characterise a given quantum structure) elaborates 
on the number of states per energy level. Throughout all the representations of 
quantum confinement, it is shown that as more dimensions of confinement are 
introduced the density of states becomes more discrete. This is most evident when 3D 
















                            DOS0D = 2δ(E − EC) 
 
Figure 4 : Graphs which show the dependence of the density of states on the energy of the 
system for a bulk material with three degrees of freedom, a quantum well with two degrees of 






It is interesting to note here that a quantum well with 2 degrees of freedom, that the 
density of states does not depend on the energy of the system. A quantum dot acts 
much like a single atom in its density of states such that it has fully discrete energy 
levels much like the energy levels of a single atom for its excitation states. 
2.3 Resonant Tunnelling Diodes 
Resonant Tunnelling Diodes (RTD), as the physical realisation of a quantum well, 
employ quantum confinement and tunnelling as the main mechanisms for the transfer 
of electrons through the system. The resonant tunnelling diode is characterised by its 
N shaped current/voltage (I/V) curve, which is a product of its negative differential 
resistance (NDR). The NDR is a region of the curve for which as the voltage continues 
to increase, the current decreases. Therefore, RTDs find use in electronics which lead 
to interesting effects which can be utilized by electronic technologies. 
Resonant Tunnelling Diodes are made up of a thin, narrow band-gap material (e.g. 
InGaAs) sandwiched between wide bandgap material (e.g. AlAs) which forms the 
double barrier and well region of the quantum well. Highly-doped, narrow band-gap 
materials are placed either side of the well structure forming an electron source/sink, 
commonly referred to as the emitter/collector regions. Due to the finite height of the 
barrier, a finite number of energy levels can be observed. In the case where the well 




2.3.1 Electron Transport Mechanisms 
The RTDs I/V curve can be simplified down into 3 sections: Tunnelling region, NDR 
and the Thermionic region. Each of these sections is due to an electron transport 
characteristic or the switch between electron transport mechanisms. 
The first section of the curve, the tunnelling region, is primarily due to the quantum 
tunnelling effect. This mechanism is what gives the device its name. Here, the curve 
increases almost linearly with the amount of voltage applied. This is due to the 
electrons, with varying energy, coming into resonance with the first energy level of the 
quantum well structure. As the Fermi level of the emitter comes into resonance with 
the first energy level current flows. With an increasing voltage bias and the electrons 
becoming more densely packed as the energy level shifts to the lower edge of the 
conduction band in the emitter region, we see the current increase as more electrons 
come into resonance with the first energy level. 
Figure 5: Single Current/Voltage spectra  of a resonant tunnelling diode divided up into 
the conduction mechanisms which is the dominant mechanism given as Tunnelling and 
Thermionic. The negative differential is shown as the drop in current from a increase in 




A sudden drop in current is observed when the energy level passes beyond the lowest 
energy of the conduction band where no electrons exist. This shift sees the main 
transport mechanism switching to a thermionic emission of the electrons which have 
enough energy to pass over the top of the barrier. As more of the electrons have the 
energy to bypass the barrier region, they will continue to do so, hence causes an 
exponential increase of current. During the switch of mechanisms, the current is not 
reduced to zero, as some electrons will already have the required energy to bypass 
the barrier region. 
2.3.2 Negative Differential Region 
The negative differential resistance (Figure 5) will occur at a range of currents and 
voltages due to the ability to shift the energy level by small amounts as shown 
previously with the energy levels inverse proportionality to L2. However, due to how 
this region is created, it is naturally unstable as such the system will show signs of 
varying current in this region as it switches between the tunnelling and thermionic 
mechanisms. Due to the uncontrollable creation of the energy level in the well, the peak 
position will occur at a unique point per device, as no device can be reliably recreated 
in the knowledge that it will clone another device. The slight tuning of the well width 
affects the energy level and hence affects where the peak will be found. It can be seen 
in Figure 5 that the NDR region has multiple plateauing regions where the current 
seems to stagnate, this is thought to be due to trapping of a charge in the confinement 
region which is shifting the energy level up. 
The NDR is useful in many physical systems of various electronic technologies. Often 
it is exploited for its fast switching of mechanisms, the stability of the carrier mechanism 




2.3.3 Implementing a Resonant Tunnelling Diode 
Resonant tunnelling diodes have a range of uses within electronic components 
because of their fast switching capabilities. The most prominent use of the RTD is to 
use the speed at which it can switch from peak-to-valley. This is useful in high-
frequency oscillators for use within signal generation technologies. The RTD has been 
shown to be able to produce signals into a THz range [17-20]. 
Further switching capabilities have been demonstrated by Sung-Yong Chung et al, by 
using RTDs in a three-terminal bipolar transistor [21]. As such, the designed transistor 
shows an ability for an adjustable peak-to-valley current ratio. The design 
implementation allows amplification and switching of high frequencies commonly used 
in modern circuits and radio-frequency systems. 
Due to the nature of an RTD and its two-state electron transport mechanism, it has 
been shown [22] that by connecting RTDs as circuit elements, that memory cells can 
be created. By connecting multiple RTDs together, multiple states can be achieved. As 
such, a normal binary system achieves two-states described by 0 or 1. A three and four 
state system of memory storage is presented by RTDs. 
Electronic systems, which until recently have used software code to simulate random 
numbers, have shown advancement using an RTD. R. Bernardo Gavito has shown the 
ability to create a true random number generator using a current driven RTD which 
outputs random switching behaviour between states [23]. As opposed to a peusdo-
random number generator which uses a complex algorithm based on many factors to 
generate a seemingly random number, the design specified outputs a random string of 
0 and 1 bits. In the same way, in which a memory implementation allows for multiple 
states for storage of bits, the same method can be applied. This would allow each 




2.4 Resonant tunnelling Diodes in Authentication 
In secure communications, each node needs to have secure access such that only 
valid users can access the information or services therein provided. This authentication 
requires each user to have a unique and impossible to replicate code such that access 
cannot be gained from users not authorized to have access to the node. An RTD 
outputs a unique signature derived from the energy level which changes per device 
due to the sub-monolayer differences in the width of the quantum well. The Quantum 
Confinement PUF, QC-PUF, describe by J. Roberts et al [1] takes the unique output of 
an RTD and uses it as an identifying secret for which authentication can be achieved. 
Each RTD shows a single Challenge-Response pair per device and is a unique 
physical object such that it constitutes a weak PUF. 
Measurements showing unique, reproducibility of single RTD are performed on 4µm2 
devices which show a peak range of 70mV and 4mA. Devices, as explained in 
subsequent sections, are shown to be unique through lack of overlap of peak positions 
and a robust signal output over repeated measurements.  
2.4.1 Peak of Tunnelling Current  
The peak at which the device switches mechanism (the point where the energy level 
is in resonance with the conduction band), is shown to be unique. This is shown by 
each device having a peak which occupies a different area within a current-voltage 
plane. Figure 6(a) shows the average peak position for 26 devices over 100 spectra. 
The peak position is calculated using a Gaussian fit as it can be used to approximate 
the tunnelling current. There is shown no overlap between the peaks, however, Figure 
6(b) shows the red boxed region in which the average peaks seem clustered, but it can 
be seen that there is no overlap between devices. By using 1.96,3.09 and 3.99 
standard errors for the 95%, 99.95 and 99.997% confidence is plotted showing the 





2.4.2 Robust Current/Voltage Characteristics   
For RTDs to be effective as a unique form of authentication and identification need to 
show robustness in their output such that the output is reliable and consistent. It is 
shown that for a single device, the I-V spectra is consistent with 100 measurements of 
a single device. Hence, showing the reproducibility of a single peak position and the 
differential current-voltage. Repeated measurement consistently lies within 2 standard 
errors of the average value. This repeat measurement is shown in Figure 7 where the 
spectra are offset for clarity. It is noted that an average measurement would be used 
for the implementation of the device to reduce the possibility of a false reading. 
 
 
Figure 6 : (a) 26 device peak position of resonant tunnelling diodes extracted using a Gaussian 
fit. (b) Red Boxed region in (a) plotted with standard deviations of 1.96, 3.06 and 3.99 for the 
95%, 99.95 and 99.997% confidence regions. (Figure courtesy of J. Roberts from: Using 
Quantum Confinement to Uniquely Identify Devices [1].)  
(a) (b) 
Figure 7: Current-Voltage spectra of 4 single devices where the measurement is repeated 100 
times. Spectra are offset for clarity of robust peak position. The current-voltage differential is 
also given for robustness of the spectrums properties. (Figure courtesy of J. Roberts from 
Using Quantum Confinement to Uniquely Identify Devices [1].) 
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 – Experimental Methods 
3.1 Arrays of RTDs 
Arrays of RTDs can be created in many ways, which can affect the speed at which the 
CRPs increase, the number of CRPs per system and the security of each CRP. Yet a 
balance must be struck so that an increase is achieved, yet information on the 
implementation of the physical system is not freely given away to an attacking party in 
the event of a side channel attack. The number of devices, d, used in these 
implementations can be described by their position in an M by N array corresponding 
to the rows and columns, respectively. 
3.1.1 Addressable Array 
Each RTD contains a single CRP, while each CRP from each RTD is unique due to 
the properties described previously, but it does not provide a large enough set of CRPs 
to make it useful in a ‘strong’ authenticable system.  
Combining single RTDs with a single CRP, each RTD is addressable as an individual 
would increase the set of CRPs for a single system. An array of devices which can be 
uniquely addressed will have a set of CRPs equal to the number of single devices in 
the system.  
 
Figure 8 (a) Schematic representation of an 
individually addressable array of size d, 
such that each device can be individually 
addressed and characterised (b) Example 
path of the circuit taken when the first RTD 





An array with each device in parallel with each other (e.g. 1 column) will cause the 
devices to have less in-series resistance as each switch will be dependent on every 
other switch in the array and hence have no more than 1 switch in-series. This means 
only 1 device can be switched on for any 1 sweep, and each device can be 
characterised individually. 
However, as each device still only creates 1 CRP, this does not constitute a large 
enough set or an exponential increase in CRPs. By restricting the access to the system, 
this would constitute a weak PUF as each device has been shown to be random and 
unique. 
3.1.2 Square Array 
A Square array is represented by having an equal number of rows and columns. The 
rows and columns are defined by the number of total devices, d, and the square root 
gives the number of both rows and columns, M. For example, 16 devices give a 4 by 4 
array. Each device would be paired with a switch, meaning that each switch can be in 
either an on or off state, independent of every other switch state. 
 
Figure 9: (a) Schematic representation of a square array 
of size M, where M2 equals the number of devices. Each 





As each device has 2 states, there are 2M
2
 permutations in this array representation. 
However, for each column, if no device is selected then the circuit for the array will be 
open. Therefore, each column will have 1 less usable permutation, so it will have 
(24 − 1)4 permutations. Hence, a 16 device, 4 by 4 array would (24 − 1)4 = 50,625 
permutations which are not open circuits. With an exponential increase, this would 
constitute a strong PUF, which increases very quickly, thus the number of permutation 
gets very large, even dwarfing previous permutations numbers as the devices increase. 
While this array has the largest growth rate of any of the representations stated here, 
the issue lies in how the system is setup and its outputs. Parallel devices cause a 
superposition of their peak position elevating to a higher current hence requiring more 
power to run. Furthermore, as the number of devices in a permutation can vary from a 
minimum of M to d, this would allow an attacker to gain valuable system information in 
a side-channel attack. 
Figure 10 : (a) Example permutation paths through a 4x4 16-device array (24 − 1)4 = 50,625 
permutations excluding open permutations. (b)Current/Voltage trace of the example paths (a) 
such that 1 permutation contains only series devices. A second path with a set of parallel 





It should be noted that while an extra parallel switch can be added to the bottom of 
each column to allow a column where a device is not selected to be bypassed. The 
number of peaks which can be seen would decrease for the permutations which were 
previously open. For 16 permutations, they would have individual devices and hence 
only 1 peak, and no combinations. So, the number of peaks will then vary from 1 to M, 
and devices in each permutation can vary from 1 to d. 
3.1.3 Linear Array 
A linear array is represented by all devices existing on a single row, with the same 
number of columns as devices, where a second row is populated by only switches 
(Figure 11). Each device is accompanied by a switch and a further switch in parallel 
where one is in an ‘on’ position (Figure 12). This representation works by allowing only 
a select, consistent number of devices to be in the circuit in any permutation, e.g. 2, 3, 
or 4 devices. Keeping the number of devices in each permutation constant decreases 
the available physical information which is helpful to an attacking party. This 
representation allows each device to be paired with every other device, without 
repeating a permutation of devices in the system.  





(ⅆ − n + 1)(ⅆ − n + 2)
2
 
Figure 11: (a) Schematic representation of a linear array, 
comprised of d devices in series. Each device is coupled with 





Where d is the number of devices and n is the number of devices per permutation. This 
formula gives a polynomial increase, which by the definition of a strong PUF is not a 
large enough increase to allow adequate security. However, with a large enough set of 
devices, the system may constitute a large enough set of permutation that it could be 
described as a strong PUF.  
 
3.1.4 Dependent Switch Array 
The following design is based on the square array; however, the design differs in one 
aspect, each switch becomes dependant on the status of the switches in the same 
column as it (Figure 13). In this representation, each column can only have one switch 
active, hence no devices will be in parallel with any other devices (Figure 14). The 
permutations for this representation of d devices will have M different choices of the 
active switch for each column, and N columns. Hence MN permutations of different 
devices establishing an exponential growth for the design. The exponential growth 
would constitute a large set of CRPs for this representation to be classed as a strong 
PUF.  
Figure 12 : (a) Schematic of potential paths 
through the linear array with 2 devices 
enabled in a 4-device array with (3)(4)/2 = 6 
permutations (Red/Blue). Longer array will 
give more permutations. (b) Traces of the 
example paths given in (a), where two peaks 
are shown. Traces correspond in colour to 







While this representation does decrease the permutations per device from the previous 
square array, it does avoid the use of excessive power due to high currents from the 
superposition of parallel devices. Hence this representation while being a lower power 
which is a requirement for that of integration with electronics with limited power. 
Additionally, with a constant number of devices per permutations, it would reduce the 
exposure of the system to information leakage.  
 
Figure 14: (a) Schematic representation of two example paths through a 4x4, 16-device array 
with 44 = 256 permutations (Red/Blue) (b) Current/Voltage example traces of the two example 
paths given in (a). Traces correspond by colour to the paths respectively. 
 
(a) 
Figure 13: Schematic representation 
of a square array, where each RTD is 
set up the same as before, yet each 
switches state is based on the state 





3.1.5 Rectangular Array 
While the design of this strong PUF array has the same concept as a dependable 
square array, it has a few layout differences to maximise the permutations that can be 
output from this array (Figure 15). By changing the ratio of M: N, rows: columns 
respectively, the array is then rectangular in nature. The rate at which the exponential 
growth occurs can be tuned to achieve maximum CRPs. 
 
As previously discussed, the general expression which gives the number of 
permutations of the system is given by MN. Generally, the permutations growth is 
proportional to the number of permutations, as an exponential growth rate. The 
expression for the growth of the system is given by 
NMN−1 
However, this expression is constrained by M × N = ⅆ, therefore if M or N is increased, 
the alternate variable will be reduced. M and N will also be constrained to only have 
values equal to that of the factors of d thus the constraints are satisfied, and the array 
is of a quadrangle nature (Figure 16). 
Figure 15: Schematic representation of 
a rectangular array where each RTD 
has the same coupled switch setup as 
the 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 square array. The 
columns (M) and rows (N) can vary 
here to increase the number of 
permutations. However, this means 
that the number of peaks seen will be 







Figure 16: (a) Schematic representation of two example paths through a 5x3, 15-device array 
with 35 = 243 permutations (Red/Blue). (b)Current/Voltages example traces of the two example 
paths given in (a) for the 5x3 array. Traces correspond by colour to paths respectively. 
By keeping the number of devices constant, it can be noted that increasing the value 
of M (columns) will increase the number of permutations which the array will output. 
Whereas, increasing the value of N, rows, will decrease the number of available 
permutations. This is shown with examples where N and M take a value ranging from 
1 to 20 (Figure 17). It can be seen in Figure 17, a vertical array (N>M) has the lowest 
output of permutations per device. Opposing that, a horizontal array (M>N) gives the 
most permutations per device. The largest increase in permutations per device is a 
point where the number of rows is between 2 and 4, centred on e. This is due to the 
increase being exponential that as N decreases, (and M increases) the rate at which 







3.2.1 Molecular Beam Epitaxy 
The diodes used are made by M Zawawi et al, at Manchester University and are further 
described for readers in their paper, ‘Fabrication of Submicrometer InGaAs/AlAs 
Resonant Tunneling Diode Using a Trilayer Soft Reflow Technique with Excellent 
Scalability’. The process for their production is described in a dedicated paper. 
Structures are fabricated in a Molecular Beam Epitaxy to generate an InGaAs/AlAs 
double barrier on an InP substrate. The double barrier structure is surrounded by a 
20nm InGaAs spacer layer, to prevent dopants from diffusing into the un-doped region 
of the barrier. Beyond the spacer layer are emitter and collector layers made from 25nm 
doped InGaAs. The emitter contact is created from highly doped 45nm InGaAs, while 
the collector contact is 400nm highly doped InGaAs. 
Figure 17: Representation of challenge-response pairs from different number of rows 
and columns in an array. The colour bar gives the number of responses for an array. 




Initially, the width of the emitter is set to be 1µm by i-line photolithography. A soft re-
flow technique is used to reduce width down to 350nm such that the emitter metal 
comprised of titanium (50nm) and gold (200nm) onto the surface of the highly doped 
InGaAs emitter. Using the top metal contact as a hard etch mask, a Reactive Ion Etch 
(RIE) with CH4: H2 (1:8) for 20 mins results in a 210nm anisotropic sidewall down to 
the collector layer. 
A further wet etch to define areas by using photoresist and UV-photolithography. With 
an etch rate of 90nm/minute using H2O: H2PO4: H2O2 at 50:3:1 to etch 300nm down to 
the InP to isolate the devices. This final etch also provides the lateral undercut on the 
air bridge. Finally, the collector contact is deposited by thermal evaporation of 
titanium/Gold (50nm/500nm). 
3.2.2 Device Preparation 
Fabricated chips contain an array of mesa sizes of 4 μm2, 9 μm2, 16 μm2, 25 μm2, and 
36 μm2, where the device characteristic is proportional to the size of the mesa region. 
Measurements in this work were all performed on a single size of the device to simulate 
the most probable overlap scenario. However, there is no qualitative difference 
between the different sizes of the mesa region so that any size of mesa would be 
integrated into the designed system. In order to show the most overlap possible, all the 





RTDs are bonded from the emitter and collector regions to a ceramic chip carrier using 
a TPT HB05 Ultrasonic wire bonder. Connections are made using 25 μm-diameter gold 
wire. The chip carrier is placed into a 28-pin IC socket on a PCB board, whereby 
connections to the array circuit are made using standard copper wires and connectors 
for the possibility of variation of devices. Measurements are all taken at room 
temperature using methods provided in subsequent sections. During the measurement 
process, devices are covered with a 3D-printed cover used to protect devices from 
unwanted dust or damage. 
3.2.3 Device Integration 
For each RTD to be addressable, it is coupled to a switch (7066N Quad Bilateral) in 
series. This is achieved by connecting each device to the array independently of others 
to allow for damaged devices to be removed and devices to be switched to vary the 
device signatures. Furthermore, for the array to vary from 1 by 1 to the maximum 
number of rows and columns, each column is paired with 1 further switch. Hence the 
number of switches used will be the maximum number of devices and columns to give 
an array which can vary in size. While this is not necessary for an array with a fixed 
number, the variation of the array allows increased practicality of the physical system. 
Variation in the size of the array allows the full categorisation of all array sizes for 
experimental tracking of the interaction between RTDs. 
A (7066N) Quad-bilateral switch requires a 3.3V or 5V source of power, depending on 
the required resistance. A higher voltage often provides a lower resistance, but with 
that, the activating voltage is proportional to an increased powering voltage. This would 
hence require balancing with respect to being a low-power system. With the use of an 
Arduino which outputs 3.3V to the I/O pins, a 3.3V source for the switch allows some 






3.3 Electronic Characterization 
The use of the designed array which will be described in following sections requires a 
few modules in its design. In a complete PUF system, some modules in the current 
design become redundant as other systems can replace them to reduce size, cost and 
weight of the system while providing a similar or equal purpose. 
3.3.1 Source-Measure Unit 
The voltage sweeps, and measurement of current are provided by a Keithley 2602B 
Source-Measure Unit (SMU). This can be carried out by other devices in the design, 
but for more accurate measurements and a stable source, the SMU is advantageous. 
The downside of this module is that it is not low power and is bulky, thus, is not practical 
to use in an IoT system which may also be a mobile system. The design of a more 
complete and smaller representation will be detailed later in this section.  
Figure 18: (a) Bottom board layout for printed circuit board of variable 4x4 array. I/O pins used 
for activating switches can be seen at the bottom on the schematic. Input of RTD array structure 
labelled (DAC/Input), Output labelled (ADC/Output). DAC/ADC lines such that the array structure 
can be easily inserted into a setup which does not require a Source-Measure Unit (b) Top board 
layout for printed circuit board. In anti-clockwise manner starting from the bottom right corner, 4 
switches which control the RTDs in each column, denoted respectively in the image. Connections 






3.3.2 System Control Modules 
The control of the switches in the array is given to an Arduino Due. Connected by 
stackable headers to the PCB (Fig) containing the array of switches and headers for 
which the devices can be connected into, the Arduino can address each switch 
individually. This means that using a complete variable array, alongside having an M 
by N array, we can also measure each RTD individually with the representation given 
in 3.1.5. The Arduino receives the challenge through the serial port which, in turn, is 
decoded to give the code for which of its I/O ports shall be switched to an active position 
of ~3.3V. The switches are first all switched to an ‘off’ position before each required 
switch is switched to its ‘on’ position completing the circuit through the chosen RTDs. 
The SMU is controlled by a Raspberry Pi 3, which contains the main program used to 
run the array and acts as a central hub to the representation. It uses the number of 
RTDs along with the array dimensions to create a permutation number which it cycles 
through to create the challenge. The challenge is subsequently passed to the Arduino 
for each permutation for the control of the required switches. It then passes a set of 
instructions to the SMU for the sweep and records the data, saving it to a file and 
displaying it on the screen. 
3.3.3 Complete Strong PUF system 
A full system includes a controlling device, e.g. Raspberry Pi, a system to control the 
input of the array system, e.g. Arduino Due, and a voltage input/current measurement 
device, Keithley 2602B SMU. As the Raspberry Pi is the controlling module, all inputs 
and outputs are channelled through this, hence data management and variability of 
inputs are given here where they are passed to the Arduino to fulfil the request for a 
specific pattern which outputs a specific signal. The Keithley is controlled directly by 





A full database containing controlling programs and PCB schematics is given for 
interested readers at https://github.com/Benasbo12/StrongArray. 
3.3.4 System Reductions 
This system has much higher power consumption than an ideal system, yet it is 
possible to decrease the power consumption of the system. The ADC and DAC lines 
of the Arduino Due can be used in lieu of the function of the SMU. This can be achieved 
by programming a sweep within the Arduino coding to output through the DAC pin 
acting as a normal sweeping mechanism. The ADC is connected to the output of the 
array, which is also connected to the ground plane by a resistor. The ADC is then able 
to measure the voltage drop across the resistor with respect to the ground plane, hence 
allowing the current to be deduced as the voltage is proportional to the current. By 
tweaking the resistance, the traces of data can be shifted to allow more peaks to be 
measured in the 3.3V range of the Arduino Due. 
Raspberry Pi 3 
Keithley 2602B  
Source-Measure Unit 
Arduino Due 
Figure 19: Schematic of Array system including the labelled Keithley 2602B Source-
Measure Unit (SMU), Raspberry Pi 3, Arduino Due and the array structure. The array 





Further reductions can be accomplished by removing the need for either the Raspberry 
Pi or the Arduino by combining the duties of one into the other. The Arduino can already 
handle the entirety of the sweeping and measuring mechanics of the system, so saving 
the data to an SD card, via Bluetooth to a laptop or mobile or outputting a peak position 
to a small screen would not be a huge step. Guides to allow this storing/transmission 
of data can be found on the internet very easily and has been shown to be possible 
before [24-26]. The Raspberry Pi, on the other hand, can use the GPIO pins as the 
digital I/O pins to activate the switches. With the use of a digital-to-analogue/analogue-
to-digital converter (DAC/ADC) [27] breakout board for a Raspberry Pi, it is possible to 
replicate the DAC/ADC setup of the Arduino Due. 
3.3.5 Experimental Values 
The values of current are taken using a source-delay measurement (SDM) method 
which is summarised as follows. Once the source is turned on, a period of latency is 
given for the output to make the transition from off to on. The trigger latency is the time 
taken to set the voltage to the source value and is fixed at 100 µs. If the output stays 
on, the latency is not repeated in subsequent cycles. 
A delay between the outputs to settle is then implemented to allow the source enough 
time to settle to the required value. The delay can range from 0 – 9999 s because often 
circuitry with high capacitance often requires longer priods of time to settle. Due to the 
complex nature of the RTDs, lower bound for the delay time is given by looking at the 
capacitance of the device and assuming a 99% of this for the circuit to stabilise. 
Capacitance can be approximated via a parallel plate capacitor, C = ε0εA/d. A is defined 
as the area of the device, 36µm2, ε as the dielectric constant of the material, 13.9, and 
d as the distance between the plates, estimated at 46.9nm. This results at 9,45 fF which 
used within V = V0(1-et/RC), with a 99% reduction, gives a value of 5RC. The delay time 
is therefore very small for the maximum resistance, given from the plateau region in 




measurements herein conducted. The value used for all measurement is taken at 
0.02s. 
Due to the nature of the resonant tunnelling diode, and the instability of the negative 
differential region, the system needs to settle before a measurement can be taken. The 
measurement time is given by the NPLC, power line cycle, which is related to the 
measurement speed. The value is given the time in which a measurement is taken and 
averaged. The range is given as 0.01 to 10, which in turn corresponds to a 
measurement time of 0.01/f to 10/f, where f is 50Hz (power line frequency). This can 
be calculated to have a measurement time of between 0.2 – 2 ms. 
The NDR, as shown in 3.4.1, begins to disappear due to added resistance and 
conduction mechanisms become very stable. The NPLC value can be reduced for 
measurements in the system requiring only peak position values. An NPLC value of 
0.1 is taken corresponding to 2ms measurement time. 
The reductions in time are necessary to reduce the time taken for each permutation 
such that the fastest overall measurement time is achieved with such a large set of 
responses. With one of the purposes of the research to create a large set of responses 
which cannot be measured in a reasonable time, the time in which all measurements 
can be taken should be explored. 
Finally, a small amount of time between each permutation measurement is taken to 
allow the switches time to settle and turn on each of the required devices. Given to be 
1s, thus time allows all switches to be turned off and each switch required to be 
switched back on. 
For an array with 256 permutations, a full characterisation of the array between 0 – 
4.0V with 100 points every 0.5V takes ~ 1 hour 20 mins. With each permutation taking 
18.6 seconds. While this may seem like a reasonable time, a 5 x 5, 25-device array 




responses, this time to measure increases beyond control. Each permutation was run 
200 times to get the best average peak position and large enough data sets for 
statistical measurements. 
3.4 Deconvolution of Characterisation 
3.4.1 In-Series Resistance 
By placing a device in-series, with an added resistance, will cause the peak position to 
shift towards higher voltages. However, the current at the peak can be seen to be equal 
for all resistances. The curve can be approximately de-convoluted into added 
resistance of RTDs in series and the original RTD spectrum using the following relation: 
ⅆIrtd








Where ⅆIrtd and ⅆItotal are the change in current outputs for the original RTD and the 
total curve for an RTD in series with a resistor, R. dV is denoted as the change in 
voltage by which the peak occurs from zero. This equation can be rearranged to extract 
peak position for a single RTD or for an in-series resistance RTD. 
Resistance shifts for a single device are shown in Figure 20. Interestingly, the increase 
in resistance removes the plateaus from the NDR region. Additionally, while the peak 
current remains invariant, the valley increases. This is due to the in-series resistance 






3.4.2 In-Series Devices 
Each permutation through an array system will give a signature which is influenced by 
many factors, the first of which being the devices own signatures, which provide the 
increased number of peaks when in series and the increased size of a peak when in 
parallel. As each device is unique, each peak can be traced back to its base RTD but 
with other influences on the device, it has a new trace from the interactions between 
the devices. The devices peaks can be traced based upon the invariance of the peak 
current such that the peak with the lowest current will occur first and the largest current 
last. 
Figure 20: Shift in peak for varying resistances, starting from left. 0, 10, 
12, 22, 39, 47, 82, 100, 180, 220. Average peak positions for 50 loops for 




The second contributor to the shift in a peak is the resistance at different sections on 
the trace of the individual devices. The first peaks shift is affected by the resistance of 
the tunnelling region of the devices which occurs after it in a series measurement. 
Whereas, the second peak is affected by the tunnelling region of every device after it 
and the thermionic region of the first peak. This will continue until the final peak is only 
affected by the thermionic region of every device before it. This is shown in Figure 21. 
Testing to see if the permutations are indeed unique compared to every other 
permutation and to each of its constituent devices, each permutation will be de-
convoluted down, removing the added resistance from the devices in parallel and 
series with it. This will distil the data down such that each peak can be evaluated 
against its base RTD.  
Figure 21: (a) Current-Voltage spectra of an average two-series system of devices. The different 
regions are split to show the conduction mechanisms most prevalent and thereby the resistance 
acting upon the system at any given moment. A and B refer to the conduction mechanism and 
their resulting resistance which are acting upon the device from (b) and (c). (b/c) Example 
Current-Voltage spectra of the average single device which make up the two-series system in 






Using the previous section, 3.4.1, we can see how an added resistance affects the 
devices and similarly, we can use this to extract the added resistance from the device 
in the case of multiple devices. Using equation (12), we can use resistances from the 
constituent devices mechanisms to calculate the approximate position of each peak in 
a combined device. Such that for each mechanism denoted by 1 and 2, which is acting 












Where ICom is the combined mechanism in the spectrum of the combined device and 
I1 and I2 are the individual mechanisms acting together resulting in the individual 
conduction mechanisms for the combined device. The derivatives are taken only from 
the valley current of the previous device to switch for the next conduction mechanisms 
average resistance as the current stays constant through the entire circuit. 
3.4.3 Combining In-Series Devices 
Initially, to understand how the devices interact and give unique responses, the 
combination of devices should be explored. While a set of parallel devices cause a 
superposition (and cause the devices to increase to a larger current), series devices 
keep a lower current with multiple peaks at increasing voltage. Peaks are then caused 
to shift from their independent positions by the added mechanisms as described in 
3.4.2. To be able to de-convolute this data such that the uniqueness of this interaction 
can be seen would provide useful insight into the mechanisms of the structure by which 
a strong array PUF interacts. Ideally, the term by which the peak shifts by should be 
statistically distributed about a central value. It can be observed through combining 





For the purposes of consistency, each device used will be of the same size, 36µm2. By 
using devices which are as similar as possible, it ensures that no extra information can 
be gained out the system such as some devices having a lower peak than others or 
outputting a shift which will occur in a specific area. Furthermore, as devices which 
have different sizes have peaks that cluster in separate locations, it is advantageous 
to have all peaks occur within the same area so that the overlap of the closest devices 
can be observed.  
 
As previously discussed, devices in series can be distinguished between which device 
is causing the peak to occur. It can be known which device’s peak is being shifted by 
that of the combination and which order they will occur in. It should be noted that this 
does not break the system of uniqueness as the shift voltage is unique and each device 
is unique, the combination of which generates our unique responses. Therefore, 
knowing which devices will occur in which position shouldn’t allow an attacker to 
decipher where any peak in an array will occur in the voltage range. 
Figure 22 (a) Example of 2 devices in series, AB and AC (Red/Blue respectively) (b) 
Current/Voltage trace of 2 devices in series AB and AC, Red and Blue respectively. It can be 
seen here that B and C occur as the first peak in their respective traces, while A occurs second 






To categorise the shift of the peak, we can define the value of the difference between 
the original peak and the peak shifted by the combination of two devices. δA defines 
the shift of the peak in terms of the voltage shift at which point the peak occurs. (Figure 
23)  
 
As each device will be of similar size, all device can be combined with one another and 
the shift in the peak should remain centred on the same point. This would allow it to be 
possible to combine the peak shift of all the different devices starting at the smallest 
until the penultimate device is only shifted by a single device. 
After the data is de-convoluted and the added resistance is accounted for, the data can 
be collated such that the range of the peak shift can be observed plotting the shift of 
the peaks. When plotted in a histogram the shift of the peak should have a normal 
distribution about the average shift of the peak.  
Figure 23: (A) I/V curve of a single devices, (AB) I/V 
curve of two devices, A and B in a series combination. 
δA categorises the difference in the peak between the 




3.5 PUF Categorization 
3.5.1 Bit Output 
Due to the way in which voltage is input into the system and current is measured, 
voltage is already divided into discrete values however current is a continuous set of 
data points with no discernible discretisation of the scale. This is due to the voltage 
sweep being a staircase sweep where the voltage is held at a specific value for the 
measurement to be taken, but the measurement of current taken is the highest degree 
of accuracy allowed. Hence to determine a bit output, some further discretisation of the 
system is required, mainly upon the current measurement. 
A discretisation can be performed by looking at the spread of the data and initially 
choosing bins with a uniform width such that if a data value falls within that bin, the 
data value is superseded by the median point of the bin itself. This would allow a 
pseudo-bit output of the system without the output being reduced to a binary system 
used specifically for the characterisation of the robustness and uniqueness of the 
system. 
Figure 24: Graphical representation of an average point bit output for 4 in series 
devices. The dotted line denotes the average voltage for each peak, and the 0 or 1 





To reduce the data down to a binary bit output a few approaches can be taken, 
however, these methods of reducing the output into bit format are purely speculation 
and are based on a theory which is untested. Hence, the algorithms described here 
may not be used in the finished product and are the subject of future work on the 
project. The first method uses an average point for each peak position calculated 
before the measurement of the peak to define a divide between a 0 and 1 bin. Upon 
measurement, it is compared to the average point whereby a negative distance from 
the average point denotes a zero and a positive distance denotes a 1 (Figure 24). This 
is repeated for each peak in the measurement and hence the bit output combined is 
equal to the number of peaks and therefore the number of peaks in series. 
The next possible solution to conversion into a bit output uses the spread of the data 
points to give a uniform output into each bin such that each bin becomes equally 
probable. Using a uniform binary bin system, the attacker cannot gain further 
information to allow a brute-force attack to be easier. The bit output is therefore variable 
depending on how many bins are chosen over the 2D Gaussian shown in Figure 25 
(a). 
The final solution to be postulated here uses the two previously denoted solutions but 
by using a different bit output described as the difference between the original peak 
and the peak when combined with different devices in series (Figure 25(b)). This shift 
can then be categorised in the same way the peak position is categorised. This would 
be by either using the average point to denote a divide between a two-bin system or 






To characterise each device as a PUF without directly calculating a bit output of the 
system, each peak position from each spectrum should be categorised by a region of 
the plane in which it occurs. The plane in which the peaks occur is divided up into 
uniform-width bins such that permutations can be compared. A method for this binning 
process is that any value falling within the bin is superseded by the median value of 
the bin. Hence, this allows the permutations peaks to be described by the bin in which 
it falls into. 
The measurements here give a description of the entire system’s properties. These are 
denoted by robustness and uniqueness. Robustness is defined here as the similarity 
between repeat measurements of a single permutation of the system. Uniqueness is 
similarly defined as a measurement of how distinct the permutations of a system are 
and there by the inversion is the measurement of how likely two distinct challenges are 
to give the same response. 
Figure 25: (a) 2D Gaussian Approximation to an ideal spread of data points across the 
Current voltage plane. Each axis split into 4, with 16 boxes covering the plane where points 
can be seen. Each point outputs a 4-bit signature. This can be increased/decreased based 
upon the spread of data. (b) 1D Gaussian approximation to spread of voltage shift of peak 
compared to original device. Axis split into 4, so each device outputs 2 bits, but can be 






Robustness and uniqueness can be calculated in a similar way and is based around 
what data points are compared. Upon comparing two data points a zero or one 
response is given based on if the data points are equal. The range of responses is 
binned by axis to create a way to categorise all peaks by where it occurs. A peak which 
lies within a bin is superseded by the median value of the bin such that all peaks which 
occur within a bin are equal. The value is compared to other measurements using 
equation 13 to calculate how distinct each permutation or subsequent measurement 
is. The distinction of permutations is shown by  
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗) =  {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑅𝑗
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑖 ≠  𝑅𝑗
   




Figure 26: Binning system for comparing peaks using equation 13 on how distinct each 





The robustness of the system can be found for each peak of a permutation individually 
or more importantly, can be found for the permutation as a whole. Summing 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗) of subsequent measurements and dividing by the number of 
measurements taken would give the probability that a subsequent measurement will 
be different to the expected output. A measure of robustness would therefore be given 









Where Ri  and Ri,t gives the initial output and output at time t, respectively and k gives 
the number of total measurements. The ideal robustness for the given equation is 1, 
i.e. each subsequent measurement is guaranteed to have an output equal to that of 
the expected output and is reliable in its measurement. 
The uniqueness is calculated in much the same way, relying on the distinctness of the 
expected output of a system. The chance that any two random inputs would produce 
an equivalent output can be found by calculating an average distinction across a set of 
permutations. A uniqueness measurement is calculated by taking 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗) of a 
permutation compared to all subsequent permutations. A sum of 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑗) is 
multiplied by a coefficient which normalizes by the number of comparisons made. For 
the following equation: 
2
k(k − 1)






An ideal uniqueness for this is 1, where each permutation is distinct and has a unique 
output from all previous and subsequent measurements. The total number of 






Both uniqueness and robustness are used here to show the effectiveness of a system 
on providing reliable yet distinct responses from all of its possible permutations. The 
metrics of robustness and uniqueness correlate directly to the probabilities of false 
positives and false negatives. False positives are defined as the probability that a 
random incorrect challenge is accepted i.e when two responses to different challenges 
are too similar. False negatives are defined as the correct challenge is declined i.e. 
when subsequent measurements give a different response to the expected output. 
As robustness affects the minimum size of bins in the plane, to keep robustness high, 
means that it also affects the uniqueness of the responses. When bin size decreases, 
uniqueness increases whereas robustness decreases unless the system outputs a 
perfectly robust system. Hence, uniqueness and robustness need to be balanced to 
keep them both as high as possible as these values are connected to the probability of 
false positive and false negatives.  
Uniqueness is difficult to calculate in terms of its relationship to subsequent 
permutations as it cannot be known if an output is truly unique or just deeply 
convoluted. For a true uniqueness to be calculated an infinite number of outputs would 
need to be tested and proven to be difficult or impossible to deconvolute. Devices can 
be fully tested to be entirely unique from one another, such that one device cannot be 
found from any of its predecessors, but would require and infinite number of 
measurements. However, an approximation can be found by using a large subset of 
the possible outputs and the previous equation. Hence in this research, a range of the 
different outputs are categorized to simulate an increasing subset which would tend 
towards showing that the system is truly unique for all permutations possible. 
A further analytic measurement is given by Perm, which is a robustness of each 
permutation. This is defined by using each peak in a permutation in the same 




 - Results and Discussion 
A maximum of 16 similar 36µm2 resonant tunnelling diodes are used in this work to 
create an exponential array representation. The arrays measured herein are created 
with the capacity to be characterised in a realistic time frame. Larger systems of arrays 
would have complete characterisation time which would render the need for protected 
access to be unnecessary. This property stems from the large set of CRPs and physical 
limitations present in a system and devices cause a single measurement time to be 
limited. The motivation being that a system can be challenged as many times in a 
reasonable time frame but still retain its security. 
Responses are manipulated such that analysis can be performed to compare all 
permutations and peak positions. The peak outputs of each representation are 
normalised with respect to the point at which the tunnelling region of each constituent 
device begins. Therefore, using a linear approximation to the tunnelling gradient, 
extrapolation to zero current gives an approximation to where the peak would start 
from. Hence it is possible to shift the peak to a normalized position to compare a 
permutation peak to constituent devices. 
4.1 Combinations of Two Devices 
As previously discussed, the combination of devices can be used outside of an array 
structure. The method allows investigation of the change in properties and how the 
unique devices interact. The 16 similar 36µm2 devices are used here to provide 120 
unique combinations of devices. Each device is combined with every subsequent 
device exactly once. Each permutation of devices has 2 combinations, however, both 
give the same output due to device position being ordered with respect to the peak 




Interesting properties necessary in the aforementioned IoT security include the 
robustness and reliability of a device and the uniqueness of the full set of permutations. 
Further, the uniqueness and spread of the permutation from its constituent device is 
rather useful to categorise. 
4.1.1 Robustness 
Robustness is defined as the similarity between multiple readings of a single 
permutation. Here, as stated in 3.5.2, a difference (diff) between peak position is the 
measure of similarity between permutations and is divided into Peak 1 and Peak 2. 
Figure 27 gives a graphical representation of the robustness for each combination of 
devices. Peak 1 is seen to be much more stable than that of Peak 2, this can most 
likely be down to the dependence of the Peak 1 affecting Peak 2. This is surmised from 
that Peak 2 being not robust in similar permutations to peak one with few differences. 
Hence, Peak 1 being unreliable is likely to cause peak 2 to be unreliable.  
Figure 27: Robustness for all 2-series combination of 16 
devices for 256 bins. (Top) Robustness for peak 1 
(Bottom) Robustness for peak 2. Robustness is given by 




As can be seen in Figure 27, the combinations show a semi-stable system of devices 
with a sizeable amount of permutations with 100% robustness. Even with some 
permutations having a large probability of false negative, the average across each peak 
are seen to be 92.3% and 92.7%. However, in Table 1, we observe that bin size plays 
a large role in the robustness measurement, where smaller bins show a decrease in 
the reliability of the measurements. 
Bins Identifier Uniqueness (%)  Robustness (%) 
32 Peak 1 97.8 92.3 
 Peak 2 98.6 92.7 
 Average 98.1 92.5 
 Perm 99.6 84.0 
16 Peak 1 93.8 96.0 
 Peak 2 94.5 93.7 
 Average 94.2 94.9 
 Perm 98.5 87.8 
4.1.2 Uniqueness 
Uniqueness, much like robustness, uses a difference measurement to define the 
similarity or difference between permutations. Table 1 shows the uniqueness between 
the combinations for individual peaks and total system for 2 distinct bin sizes. The 
uniqueness of the system for 16 bins is given as 98.5, with a 1.5% chance for two 
permutations to be the same. However as can be seen, by increasing the bins to 32 
over the same range, 99.6% is observed. The uniqueness is dependent on the 
robustness of the measurements and needs to be balanced. It can be seen that the 
more robust a system, the more unique and distance each of its permutations can be. 
Table 1: Uniqueness and robustness percentages for an average across 
all peak and peaks 1 and 2 individually for all combinations of 16 RTD 
devices in series. The measurements are made for multiple variations on 




While it cannot be indicated if the system has permutations be truly unique from its 
constituent device, it is shown that there is no one place where permutations are 
completely concentrated on. This makes the combination of devices difficult to predict 
without further information about the system.  
It can be assumed that the robustness in these measurements is not as reliable as 
required, as a 100% robust system would allow for a highly unique and distinct system 
for a large number of bins over the range of responses. Thus allowing small deviations 
from permutation to permutation to be visible and make them entirely distinct. 
4.1.3 Voltage Shift  
Voltage shift of a peak due to an in-series device/resistance is described in 3.4.3. The 
shift is voltage is characterised by a δA term which is a combination of all added 
resistances acting upon the shifted peak. This shift in peak is the secondary source, 
besides that of the individual devices, of uniqueness in the system which makes it 
suitable for security purposes. 
Figure 28(a/b) shows the peak voltage shift for each combination from its derivative 
devices peak. From this, it is obvious that the shift for each device is concentrated 
around a similar point for all peaks, however, this is due to the devices all being of the 
same size. Devices being the same size causes a similar resistance hence causing 
similar shifts due to the added resistances of in-series RTDs. What can be seen is that 
not all devices are shifted by the same amount indication that the slight differences in 





Figure 28(c/d) shows the shift with respect to the device which causes the shift of the 
derivative RTD. It can be seen here that the devices don’t cluster perfectly such that 
each device seems not to shift the derivative RTD by the same amount each time. The 
shift is more clustered in Peak 1; however, this would be due to the larger variation in 
resistance in the thermionic region as current increases. The larger distinction in the 
thermionic region can be explained by the fact that the valley point is subject to the 
energy level causing the tunnelling region. Thereby, the Thermionic region has some 
dependence on the tunnelling region and at which point the transport regime switches. 
Figure 28: (a/b) Histogram of voltage shift for of 2-series devices, colour coded by the 
derivative device from which each peak in question is derived from. (c/d) Histogram of voltage 
shift where colour coding refers to the device which acts upon the derivative device, i.e. the 
device which causes the shift in peak. (a/c) Peak 1 (b/d) Peak 2 (Legend) Colour codes for 







4.2 Dependant-Switch Array 
The dependant-switch array is created as defined in 3.1.4 and 3.2.3, whereby its ability 
to vary in size allows measurements ranging from a 4x4 16-device array down to a 2x2 
4-device array. The RTDs inserted into the array are similar 16 devices of size 36 µm2 
for maximum overlap in the permutation spread. 
For each system here, we took a simple binning algorithm such that all bins are of 
uniform width. This can be changed to a variable bin width giving the occupation of 
each bin to be uniform giving equal probability to all possible outcomes. The outcome 
would give an even spread of data points. As we saw previously, that the number of 
bins doesn’t affect the system properties greatly and hence the number of bins per axis 
is set at the same as the number of devices in the system. 
The noteworthy experimental values for the measurement of this system are main 
influences on the time to characterise. The NPLC of the system is set at 0.1, to give a 
fast measurement of each point at the cost of accuracy. This gives that a new value 
can be reported no faster than at 2ms intervals. The delay between measurements is 
then set at 20ms such that the system has time to reduce capacitance. Finally, 200 
loops are performed to give plenty of data to perform a statistical analysis. 
4.2.1 Robustness 
The 4x4 array system, being the largest of the arrays given here, has an output of 256 
permutations and 4 peaks. The robustness can be calculated for each permutation 
divided into individual peaks, an average across each peak for all permutations 
(denoted as Total) and finally a total robustness for the array (Perm). Each analytical 
measurement is computed by equation (14). A similar approach is taken for each of 





As expected, the stability of each peak is not independent of the whole sweep. This is 
evident from the shift in robustness to a more stable system for later permutations. This 
could be due to the system settling during measurement or due to external vibrations 
reducing across the system. The pins of the system, to allow for easy measurement of 
the system and prototyping needs have jumper cables, not hard-wired in the system, 
hence a shift in the connections can cause resistances to shift. Either of these 
explanations accounts for the changing resistances possibly seen within the system, 
especially within the early permutations. 
Figure 29 (a) Percentage robustness measurements over 200 loops for all 256 permutations of 
a 4x4 dependant-switch array. Each plot is the robustness of a different peak, with the first peak 
occurring at the top and the fourth peak occurring at the bottom (b) Robustness measurements 
over 200 loops for all 27 permutations of a 3x3 array. Peak 1 occurs at the top, and Peak 3 
occurs at the bottom.    (c) Robustness measurement for the 4 permutations of a 2x2 array. 






For the 4x4 array, as seen in Figure 29(a), has a robustness above 75% for most peaks 
after permutation 70. It can be seen that some permutations do have 100% robustness, 
owing to the notion that a perfectly reliable system is possible. A hard-wired system 
with less movement due to external influences can negate this and increase overall 
robustness of the entire set of permutations. 
Across all peaks, the average robustness measures to be 85.6% (Table 2). However, 
as seen in the majority of points, it can be noted that this could easily tend to a higher 
reliability in the event that early permutations are settled and vibrations through the 
system's connections are negated. Hence for a dedicated system which required all 
hardwired elements, a robustness of 90%+ or higher is achievable. 
The 3x3 and 2x2 array, have ~70% and ~80% robustness, respectively. While these 
values are calculated in the same way as previously, the lack of permutations make 
these values have a high uncertainty. Due to the large number of measurements 
required for a complete statistical analysis of the system, 27 and 4 permutations are 
not enough to give an accurate average for the system. This is compounded by the 
large deviations between peak robustness. Larger arrays of devices would give a more 
accurate measurement of the system. 
Through extrapolation of these small arrays, it can be theorised that larger arrays will 
have similar robustness. However, for a practical application, a higher reliability may 
be required. It is likely for increased reliability to be found in a hard-wired, variation-
less system and through slower more accurate measurements. Due to potential 
security flaws, a requirement of the system is the time taken for a characterisation, so 







Array Size Bins Identifier Uniqueness (%) Robustness (%) 
4x4 256 Peak 1 76.8 83.9 
  Peak 2 95.0 78.4 
  Peak 3 94.4 82.8 
  Peak 4 92.3 81.0 
  Average 85.6 81.5 
  Perm 99.7 60.7 
3x3 64 Peak 1 56.1 81.2 
  Peak 2 87.5 66.3 
  Peak 3 76.9 73.0 
  Average 73.9 73.5 
  Perm 97.4 54.4 
2x2 16 Peak 1 83.3 95.0 
  Peak 2 66.7 68.1 
  Average 75.0 81.5 
  Perm 83.3 66.7 
Table 2: Uniqueness and robustness measurements divided into a total measurement 
and each peak of the system individually. Each set of measurements are detailed for 
a 4x4, 3x3 and 2x2 array with bins per axis corresponding to the number of devices 
per array. 
4.2.2 Uniqueness 
Calculated in the same way to that of the combinations seen in 4.1.2, a 4x4 array has 
99.7% uniqueness of the permutations. This gives that 0.3% of comparisons between 
the 256 permutations are the same. A high uniqueness allows the chance of any 
random output being successful or providing a false positive when compared to the 
expected output to be low. However, a requirement for an authentication system is that 
a single attempt has a 1 × 108 probability to succeed or false acceptance [28]. 
Again, a 3x3 and 2x2 are scarce on information due to lack of permutations such that 
uniqueness has large uncertainties. From the given analysis, it can be seen that the 
uniqueness of the 3x3 and 2x2 permutations is high for a small set of bins. It can be 
noted from the analysis that with extrapolated larger data array would produce a higher 
uniqueness, yet at the cost of reliability. Hence the main improvement in the system 





4.2.3 Voltage Shift 
The shift in voltage given in Figure 30 shows that the shift is peak shift is centred on a 
similar point for each individual peak. This is due to each device being of the same 
size, so resistances and hence the shift due to resistance is similar. The shift becomes 
more concentrated and detached with subsequent peaks, this is most likely due to the 
resistance of the thermionic region reducing as current increases. The thermionic 
region has a lower average resistance compared to the tunnelling region which would 
cause a less unique shift. 
Due to the peak current affecting the order in which devices occur, devices tend to be 
probabilistic in terms of which position the device will occur in the response. Most 
notably this can be seen for RTD 7 (Yellow) which occurs only in peak 1 and RTD 5 
which occurs only in peak 4. 
By looking at a single device it would not be possible to accurately determine where 
that device will occur unless the output of every subsequent device is also known. A 
single device will have a probability of occurring in any position based on the range of 
possible RTD outputs.  
Further, the exact output cannot be known unless a complete output of every device is 
known. As noted in 3.4, for a set of in series devices, without directly measuring each 
individual device. As each permutation is measured, more becomes known about the 
system. If the input is known, then the position of each device relative to other devices 
is revealed. Therefore, as more information about the system is gathered, this 





An implication of similar devices is that a peak shift for a single device can cluster. This 
can be seen in RTD 1 (Dark Red) which clustered in the same bin in Peak 2. However, 
it can be that the shift across devices still shows a spread. Most notably this can be 
seen in RTD 16 (Dark Blue) by which the device seems to spread relatively uniformly 
across the range in peaks 2, 3 and 4.  
4.3 Permutation Spread 
Any spread of data is useful if the overlap between values is minimal and points are 
well defined. However, the spread should have little to no visible trend which would 
give extra information about the position in which a response would appear. This allows 
each data point to be distinct without allowing the response of the system to be 
guessed.  
Figure 30: Histogram of the voltage shift of the peak from its derivative device for (a) Peak 1 (b) 
Peak 2 (c) Peak 3 (d) Peak 4 of a 4x4 16-device dependant-switch array needs something to show 
which is the smallest device vs the biggest device. Colour coding shows the derivative peak for 







The 4x4 set of data shows a slight positive correlation, with areas which show clustering 
of points. This is to be expected with similar devices. In light of clustering permutations, 
a high reliability is required to allow each output to be distinct. Further, each 
permutation should give out a unique permutation where permutations may look similar 
but still output a distinct response.  
Permutation peak outputs given in Figure 31 are peaks which are normalized such that 
each peak position can be compared to one another. The permutations peaks occur 
within the same region of space at varying currents and voltages, which spread across 
most of the bin-able region
Figure 31: (a) Peak position of 4 Normalized peak position for 4 peaks of 256 permutations 
for 4x4 array of 16, 36µm2 RTD devices. (b) Red outlined area of (a) to show distinct points 




 -  Conclusion 
In summary, the system of secure authentication proposed here shows merit as a 
possible strong physical uncloneable function. The design is low cost, easy to produce, 
integrate into small lightweight systems and contains a large set of authentication 
responses for a single system. A single 4x4 system has shown the ability to have 256 
varying stable and reliable outputs based on 16 unique signatures combined. The 
responses show unique and distinct responses from other permutations of the system 
such that a variety of CRPs can be produced. 
The combination of devices is shown to be distinct from other permutations through an 
initial characterisation of 2 in-series devices. The shift in peak is described as a result 
of the unique resistances from the set of unique devices in a combination. The unique 
resistance is a by-product of negligible differences in the physical structure of the 
devices which then cause the device acted upon to shift by an uncontrollable amount. 
Further weaknesses come in the form of possibility to create a software-based model 
of the system once the constituent devices are fully categorised. The way around this 
issue is to use a fully internal measurement apparatus described in 3.3.4. Achievable 
by reducing the current system down into a small easy-to-use system with the bare 
minimum required to measure and control the resonant tunnelling diodes. A further 
possible development comes in the form of a timed authentication PPUF which used a 
possible software model as an authentication technique [29]. The representation works 
on the premise that permutations are difficult to reduce into constituent devices and a 





For a practical system meeting the requirements of an electronic authentication system 
[28], the robustness and reliability of subsequent measurement shall be increased, 
which will directly affect the uniqueness of the design. While further testing on 
rectangular arrays is necessary to maximise the output, a proof of concept has been 
provided. The current design serves as a strong PUF with opportunities to further 
develop the system into a practical application of a unique authentication system. 
5.1 Future Work 
Further research to advance the project of creating a strong PUF from devices 
employing quantum confinement as a source of unique responses are required. The 
system described herein needs to be characterised fully on its abilities to return 
responses. Its ability can be shown in two ways, the first being the size of the CRP 
array and secondly, the time it takes to return a single response. Further advancements 
in the size of possible arrays and CRP sets is easily explorable. However, the speed 
in which a single response can be output becomes a key component in reducing the 
exposure of the system. 
A reduction in the measurement time to the limit of the performance of the system will 
give an approximation of the minimum time to fully characterise an array. The time is 
limited in several ways including bottlenecks in data transfer, charge build-up on 




As discussed previously, the reduction of the system down to a single system is 
required to make the representation viable for the applications described in Chapter 1, 
and to successfully prove that the system can be low cost and low power while 
maintaining security. A bit output needs to be successfully installed to keep the device 
unique while outputting a uniform spread of bits where no bit string is preferential over 
any other. Finally, the system needs to be successfully proved to be an authentication 
method. Whether it be creating a database of challenge-response pairs before use, or 
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